Recent events have fostered an increased awareness of the specter of chemical and biological terrorism. Widely televised images of the anthrax scares in Florida, New York, and Washington, DC, have evoked significant alarm in the American public about the bioterrorist threat. In 1995, the sarin nerve agent attack on commuters on the Tokyo subway system demonstrated that a chemical attack was possible on civilian targets. 1, 2 Because terrorism relies on fear as a weapon, even the threat to use such agents can produce the desired effect. Consequently, the public health system, hospitals, and emergency medical services must be prepared to respond to all reported terrorist attacks, even if a given incident is subsequently established as a hoax. More than ever before, there is heightened concern about the ability of the United States to manage such Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorist events effectively.
Although reported less than the events of September 11, the United States had already been the target of biological terrorism a decade previously. Over a two-month period during 1984, a total of 751 individuals in Oregon developed Salmonella gastroenteritis. The outbreak was eventually traced to followers of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, who had disseminated a biological agent in an attempt to manipulate local elections. 3 In another instance, residues of cyanide were reportedly found at the site of the February 29, 1993, explosion at the World Trade Center in New York City. 4 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported 37 investigations into threats of WMD development or use in 1996, and 181 in 1998. By May 1999, the FBI had already opened 123 investigations, 100 involving the alleged use of a biological agent, most commonly anthrax. 5, 6, 7 Cincinnati, Ohio, is located in southwestern Ohio, on the banks of the Ohio River. It is the 23rd largest metropolitan area in the United States, with a population base of 1,948,264 in the Greater Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky area. 8 Results of the 1990 census indicate that the patient population is similar to the general U.S. population in terms of age, gender, and socioeconomic status. 9 Despite its comparatively small size, Cincinnati has already been involved in several reported WMD events. On October 30, 1998, four abortion clinics in three different states (Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee) received letters claiming to contain anthrax; all four had Cincinnati postmarks. 10 On February 18, 1999, Cincinnati received the first of three anthrax threats. 11 The United States Department of Defense used Cincinnati for a tabletop exercise involving WMD 12 because it represented "a typical medium-sized city." As a result of the exercise, it was deemed that the city was ill-prepared to manage a WMD threat, but the specific reasons were never disclosed to the public. 12 Due to the concern about vulnerability to chemical and biological terrorism, the Congress of the United States passed a series of laws aimed at expanding the government's abilities to manage the WMD threat. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201), also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici act after its Congressional sponsors, authorized $100 million in federal funds to assist local governments in preparing for WMD events. One hundred and twenty cities, including Cincinnati, were identified to undertake the initial training to augment their preparedness.
Under the auspices of the Domestic Preparedness Program, the City of Cincinnati and surrounding communities participated in a chemical weapon functional exercise (CWFX) on May 20, 2000. The purpose of this article is to describe basic components of the prehospital medical response to terrorist incidents, the problems encountered in scene management, and the lessons learned in improving preparedness for the real event. Although the exercise was multi-jurisdictional and involved many different types of responders, this article will focus on the pre-hospital medical response to a simulated chemical WMD event as an early warning system in place for hospitals and public health departments. It is an observational study based upon the response to a mass casualty nerve agent scenario, as described below.
SCENARIO
On the morning of May 20, 2000, city employees and their families gathered indoors at the local sewer district plant for the purpose of a family day. At approximately 0900 hours, people attending the festivities began to develop symptoms from a chemical agent being dispersed from a helium tank used to inflate the party balloons. People closest to the tank collapsed. The remainder of the exposed victims began running from the room and down a narrow stairway, in an attempt to flee the building. Some victims collapsed on the stairs, while others were trampled in the rush to exit the building.
Within minutes, multiple calls were received by the local 911 operator system, reporting multiple victims ill from an unknown chemical exposure. An engine company was dispatched to investigate further, and arrived to find victims running and crawling from the building, with some subsequently collapsing outside. The ambulatory victims rushed the arriving engine company, which in turn tried to both assess the situation and calm a growing crowd of victims. Ambulatory patients complained of eye pain, dim vision, and chest tightness. Others were noted to be apneic or seizing.
A mass casualty incident was then declared, and a request made for additional mutual aid resources. The first engine companies began gross decontamination while awaiting ambulances and hazardous materials units.
RESULTS
The exercise involved 120 victims, 35 of whom were dead at the outset and represented by paper cut-outs. The remaining 85 victims were triaged by the responding EMS units. Using the Simple Triage and Rapid Transport (START) system ( Figure 1 ), 15 of the victims were classified as red (immediate evacuation required), while 30 were classified as yellow (delayed evacuation), and the remaining thirty-nine were classified as green (ambulatory). 13, 14 One patient was classified as black (deceased or expectant).
The first emergency medical service (EMS) unit to respond was a Cincinnati Fire Department (CFD) paramedic ambulance. A total of four CFD advanced life support ambulances and six CFD basic life support ambulances participated in the triage, management, and evacuation of casualties. Another 20 ambulances were provided by neighboring communities through the mutual aid network. The CFD EMS field supervisor, designated "Rescue 1," was also on-scene to assist with triage and patient care.
In addition to the 30 EMS units, the American Red Cross Medical Assistance Team (MAT) responded to the event with a cadre of physicians, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. Upon their arrival, the MAT team assumed control of triage, medical care, and stabilization from the CFD first responder units. Patients were then transported by ground ambulance to seven local hospitals for further medical management.
A secondary device was discovered on the premises, which necessitated the evacuation of triage personnel and patients to a new location. The new triage area, located upwind of the original site, was established prior to the conclusion of the exercise.
DISCUSSION
The pre-hospital medical response to the simulated terrorist event can be divided into four separate stages: (a) gross patient decontamination, (b) triage, (c) medical care, and (d) transportation to receiving facilities. Although each step is discrete in theory, there is sig- Management of the hazardous material incident may be considered as occurring in three discrete areas or zones with respect to contamination risk ( Figure  2 ). 15, 16, 17 The Hot Zone, also referred to as the Exclusion Zone, represents the area of highest agent concentration, and is therefore of greatest threat to life and health. Rescue personnel would not be expected to operate in the Hot Zone except in Level A Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Victims would be evacuated rapidly from the Hot Zone to minimize exposure time to the hazardous material. The Warm, or Contamination Reduction Zone forms a buffer between the area of gross contamination and uncontaminated areas. Decontamination of victims typically takes place in the Warm Zone, with decontaminated patients being subsequently transitioned to the Cold Zone. Also known as the Support or Clean Zone, the Cold Zone contains only decontaminated patients and EMS workers. Triage, medical care and stabilization, patient transport, and incident command all occur within the safety of the Cold Zone.
Decontamination
Description. Medical decontamination is performed at the scene upon victims and rescue personnel to limit primary injury as well as to prevent secondary contamination of care givers. Decontamination involves removal of the patient from the Hot Zone, removal of clothing, and a sixty-second head-to-toe water rinse. Although not scientifically proven, removal of clothing is considered the most expedient method of gross decontamination, accounting for an estimated 80% of the process. 18 Water-based showering, with or without soaps or dilute bleaches, furthers the decontamination process. 15, 16 The importance of gross decontamination at the scene was highlighted during the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995. 19, 20 Of the 1,364 first responders transporting contaminated patients to receiving hospitals, 10% became victims due to the off-gassing of the volatile sarin in the hot, poorly ventilated ambulances and Tokyo Fire Defense Agency minivans. 16, 20, 21 Eleven of 15 physicians caring for victims at a single local receiving hospital also reported symptoms attributable to sarin offgassing, with six requiring atropine. 21 Decontamination was rapidly performed by the responding fire and hazardous materials (HazMat) units during the exercise. Prior to the arrival of the dedicated HazMat units, the two first-responder pumper units coordinated a temporary decontamination shower for the victims. The first responders also rapidly established a Hot Zone perimeter for the initial decontamination. The first responding units' speed in gaining control of the crowd was of paramount importance for subsequent mass decontamination. The arriving HazMat unit deployed a mass casualty shower system and further refined the event perimeter, defining the warm and cold zones in addition to the pre-established hot zone. Decontamination proceeded through the shower, which spanned the warm zone and opened into the cold zone for subsequent triage and medical stabilization.
Lessons learned. Anticipate initial difficulty in establishing scene priorities. In this scenario, the engine company that responded first was met by a stream of screaming victims, which distracted the company from initial scene evaluation. The four firefighters were pressed to gain rapid control of the situation, activate the incident command system, and begin gross decontamination. It remains unclear whether a small cadre of firefighters could gain control so efficiently in the setting of an actual terrorist event. It also remains unclear whether such crowd control would be possible in the setting of 5,500 victims, as in the Tokyo incident. However, it is likely that the majority of people in a large event would disperse prior to arrival of first responders, and that those remaining would comprise individuals too sickened to escape.
Anticipate manpower needed to decontaminate nonambulatory patients. Due to the artificial nature of the drill, patients triaged "red" during the initial evaluation ambulated through the decontamination shower tent. In reality, these patients would require fire department assistance both for ambulation and decontamination, which would slow the decontamination process significantly and divert responders from other functions.
Make preparations for cold weather decontamination. Another issue to arise involved post-decontamination care of the victims. The weather was inclement on the day of the event, with occasional showers and fine cold mists. If not for the rapid availability of blankets Early decontamination line. For decontamination and triage to be effective and efficient, early control of the victims is essential. In a real event, would the first responding units be as effective at rapidly organizing the crowd of hysterical "victims" into an orderly decontamination line? through the American Red Cross, gross decontamination by removal of clothing and subsequent showering might have resulted in multiple cases of hypothermia. Such a problem could further compromise victims of an actual chemical agent attack, and further tax limited resources.
Anticipate reluctance to remove clothing for effective decontamination. The individuals participating at the functional exercise were pre-notified of the decontamination phase, and had the option not to participate; these were identified a gray armband. Participants who chose to be decontaminated wore bathing suits. It is unclear how many patients would be willing to completely undress and then undergo further decontamination during an actual mass casualty event. 15 Would the potential risk of a chemical agent be enough to overcome the modesty of the crowd? Would scared, hysterical individuals be able to comprehend the rational need to remove clothing as part of decontamination? Finally, the successful lawsuit brought by two female police officers in a suburb of Seattle raises the issue of ensuring adequate privacy during the decontamination process. 22 The deployable decontamination shower is an attempt to address these issues by providing some semblance of enclosure and by separating men and women.
Continue to monitor and reassess victims. Once decontamination had occurred, no further patient monitoring was performed for residual contamination. As a result, incompletely decontaminated patients might have continued to "off-gas" volatile agents during triage, treatment, and transportation, with resultant harm to other victims and to the EMS providers. Decontamination protocols must stress the need for continued reassessment and monitoring.
Triage
Description. The term triage comes from the French word trier, meaning "to sort." 23 The goal of triage in a mass casualty incident is to do the greatest good for the greatest number of individuals. 15 To this end, the most common system in use today is the Simple Triage and Rapid Transport system, or START (Figure 1 ). This color-based system categorizes individuals on the basis of three parameters: airway, circulation, and mental status. Individuals are then placed in one of four color-coded groups representing acuity: red (immediate), yellow (delayed), green (ambulatory), and black (expectant or deceased). 13, 14, 23 During the current scenario, eighty-five patients were seen and triaged by the responding personnel. A total of fifteen were classified red, thirty were yellow, thirty-nine were green, and one patient was classified black.
Lessons learned. Select a dedicated triage officer early in the incident.
Patients cannot be managed effectively without initial triage to coordinate patient evaluation and care. In this scenario, the triage officer was also controlling transportation to and from the scene, and had to contend with some initial communications failures between the scene and the responding ambulances. This in turn led to an initial delay in triage after the gross decontamination had been performed, with all the patients clustered on the lawn awaiting further evaluation for a short period of time. After the initial delay, triage zones were rapidly established, with the red zone appropriately located closest to the exit for rapid evacuation. In an actual emergency, these "victims" would likely have dispersed without further decontamination or treatment.
Anticipate that victims may try to return to the incident site. An unexpected issue involved the desire of patients triaged to the green area to leave the Cold Zone and return to the Hot Zone to search for loved ones left behind in the building. Little consideration was given to securing the lower acuity triage zones, and to the staffing that this would require. Moreover, when individuals did run into the Hot Zone in an attempt to re-enter the building, the need for repeated decon-Recontamination of victim. A lack of watchfulness at the Green triage area allowed this "distraught mother" to cross back into the Hot Zone in an attempt to rescue her child. This resulted in repeated exposure to the nerve agent of both the mother and the firefighters. tamination was overlooked in the rush to gain control of the victims and remove them from the Hot Zone.
Correlate triage with decontamination. It is recommended that two decontamination corridors exist in a chemical mass casualty incident, one for ambulatory patients and one for non-ambulatory patients. 16 Ideally, an initial triage could have been performed concomitant with evacuation from the Hot Zone, such that red and yellow patients were expedited at the expense of green and black (Figure 2) . Upon leaving the Warm Zone, the triage officer could redirect the patients to an appropriate zone for further care and transportation.
Train in protective gear. Little is known about the ability of responders wearing Level A Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to triage patients accurately and rapidly. Tactile stimulii as well as ability to communicate are decreased by the wearing of PPE. 15 Military studies have demonstrated that increased time is requireed for establishing intravenous lines by EMTs in chemical protective suits. 24 A simplified triage based on ambulatory status and level of consciousness would be feasible even in Level A protective suits, and would not only direct patients to the correct decontamination corridor but also to the correct level of care.
Ambulance staging area. Limited access to the triage area resulted in queuing of responding ambulances.
Medical care of the sick and injured
Description. In addition to rapid decontamination and triage, appropriate stabilization and care of the injured is critical in reducing the number of victims at any mass casualty event. Included in this category would be advanced life support techniques, immobilization with spinal precautions, and rapid administration of antidotes where available. During the functional exercise, patients presented with signs and symptoms of nerve agent exposure, including visual complaints, chest tightness, rhinorrhea, and lacrimation. The first units responding to the event determined clinically that the unknown agent likely represented a chemical nerve agent.
Lessons learned.
Initiate early notification of hospitals and the public health system. Even prior to the detection of the agent at 1010 hours and the verification of the agent at 1044 hours, CFD command had begun calling hospitals to inquire about stockpiles of antidotes. However, little additional information was provided to hospitals about the scope of the situation and the numbers of victims to be expected. Ideally, rapid identification of the type of agent and communication from the scene to receiving hospitals should be ac-complished. In Cincinnati, an on-scene physician provides information about the scene and number of victims to receiving hospitals, public health departments and the regional poison control center.
During the Tokyo subway incident, the chemical agent was initially misidentified, and the true agent involved in the attack was not determined until three hours after the event. 20 Nearly 90% of Tokyo victims bypassed EMS efforts and self-triaged to unsuspecting hospitals, highlighting the importance of keeping hospitals informed of events at the scene. 1, 20 Prepare responders that mass casualty care is not routine care. Patients triaged by the CFD were initially transported from the scene without receiving any further treatment. The MAT team physicians and nurses initiated more aggressive therapy when they arrived, including endotracheal intubation of victims in extremis. This required staffing to ensure adequate ventilation, resulting in the use of MAT team support personnel to assist with bag valve ventilation. In situations with significant personnel shortages, such victims would and should be declared expectant. This frequently proves a very difficult decision for a physician or nurse to make, armed with the knowledge that in other circumstances the patient is salvageable.
Should intubation be warranted, one option would have been to employ victims from the green triage area to assist with the care of the intubated victims, thus freeing up needed medical personnel.
Expect that demand for antidote may overwhelm available supplies. It remains unclear how many patients could have been effectively treated at the scene described in this article. A survey of the mutual aid companies was undertaken by incident commanders to determine the amount of available atropine at the scene: 88 mg. Current military guidelines require the administration of 3 mg atropine IM and 10 mg IM to any patient triaged as "red." 25 The available atropine would not have been sufficient for even initial treatment of the red and yellow patients. The MAT team, which treated patients prior to transport, administered a total of only 22 mg atropine to patients prior to their evacuation. Additionally, pralidoxime chloride was not available at the scene. To enhance distribution of largescale stockpiles of antidotes for rapid treatment of victims, Cincinnati is developing a physician-based call system for WMD events. The on-call physician will respond to the event, rapidly assess the situation, and activate distribution of the appropriate antidote stockpile.
Vehicle contamination. In the confusion of a mass casualty incident, hazardous materials containment may easily be overlooked, resulting in the contamination of crews and re-exposure of contaminated victims.
Transportation
Description. Once decontaminated, triaged, and medically stabilized, patients need to be evacuated rapidly to a site of definitive care. In the setting of a mass casualty event, orchestrating the ingress and egress of ambulances is of paramount importance. Rapid decontamination and triage will have little result without effective evacuation to a site of definitive care. A dedicated transportation officer should be designated by the incident commander immediately upon declaration of a mass casualty incident. The transportation officer then has the responsibility of securing optimal traffic flow through the scene and ensuring appropriate transportation order for triaged patients. 26, 27 In this scenario, effective evacuation required communication between 21 different EMS agencies, the MAT team, and the local hospitals. The transportation officer controlled access of vehicles to the scene, coordinated staging at the scene, and controlled patient flow from the triage area to the ambulances. In just over two hours, all patients had been transported to hospital, reflecting an efficient process.
Lessons learned.
Maintain control of access routes. As access was limited to a two-lane road leading to the gated triage area, delays were unavoidable. In the desire to evacuate their patients from the scene rapidly, two mutual aid squads performed J-turns in the patient loading area to bypass the queue. This resulted in the squads inadvertently crossing into the Warm Zone and potentially becoming contaminated, which highlights the importance of following the commands of the transportation officer and the designated route. The use of safety cones to indicate routes of ingress and egress might have assisted drivers further and prevented accidental squad contaminations.
Maintain one person-one task approach. The single transportation officer was tasked with multiple critical functions. During future operations, a three-person Transportation Sector will be established. One officer will operate the radio and coordinate communications with the regional disaster network radio operator. Another officer will be responsible for tracking patient information and destination. The third will be in charge of ambulance communications and staging.
CONCLUSIONS
On May 20, 2000, the City of Cincinnati and its surrounding communities had the opportunity to participate in a large-scale chemical weapons functional exercise, the goal of which was to assist in training and preparedness for a chemical WMD attack. The process was designed to be educational rather than to find fault with the local response system. A secondary goal was to identify any unexpected weaknesses not previously noted during tabletop exercises prior to an actual event. Individual and system-wide problems could then be addressed, allowing the city and the surrounding metropolitan area to be better prepared to handle an actual incident.
The drill offered insights into the pre-hospital medical response to terrorist incidents. A total of 21 local EMS agencies, the American Red Cross MAT team, and two hazardous materials teams participated in the exercise, in addition to local and federal law enforcement agencies. Eighty-five victims were decontaminated, triaged, treated, and transported, all within a two-hour period.
Many lessons were learned about the different components of pre-hospital medical response. With regard to decontamination, it is important to anticipate the initial difficulty in establishing scene priorities, the staffing required for nonambulatory victims, the special concerns of cold weather decontamination, the reluctance of victims to disrobe, and the role of continued reassessment. In terms of triage, it is essential to select a dedicated triage officer early in the incident to anticipate that victims may return into the Hot Zone, to correlate triage with decontamination, and to train in protective gear in anticipation of a real incident. With medical care of victims, it is necessary to initiate early notification of hospitals and the public health system to recognize the unique features of mass casualty care and to prepare adequate antidote stockpiles in advance. For transportation of victims, providers must maintain control of access routes as well as a one person-one task approach to scene management.
The most effective approach to terrorist incident management involves strengthening the continuum of care among the pre-hospital medical response, the hospital system, and the public health departments. Realistic drills provide an invaluable opportunity to integrate these links, and local jurisdictions should be encouraged to conduct these exercises to augment their preparedness. The observations and lessons learned can then be applied to saving lives during an actual terrorist attack.
